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Abstract. The term “time-plan” is introduced in the article to sum up the diversity 
of temporal processes described by Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) in the frame-
work of the general Planmässigkeit of nature. Although Uexküll hardly had any 
connections with his contemporary philosophies of time, the theme of the sub-
jective times and timing of the organisms forms an essential part of his umwelt 
theory. As an alternative to the dominance of evolutionary time in biological 
discussions, Uexküll took perceptual and developmental times of organisms as 
his natural scientific priorities. While discussing the characteristics of the latter, 
Uexküll departs from an epigenetic position. Discussion about perceptual time 
entails detecting the primary units of time (moments) as well as how the succession 
of moments results in the perception of movement. The last part of the article will 
explicate the significance of the “time plan” concept for biophilosophical discus-
sions. It is suggested that the bioethical question rising from Uexküll’s works may 
take the following form: do other biological subjects besides humans have a right 
to their own timing?
In 1973 the Ukrainian evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobz -
hansky — one of the founding figures of modern evolutionary synthesis — 
published a popular-scientific article Nothing in biology makes sense 
except in the light of evolution (Dobzhansky 1973). The title of the article 
soon became a catchphrase that sums up the seminal paradigm of all 
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biological sciences in the last 150 years. But besides the elaboration and 
empirical confirmation of evolutionist ideas through Neo-Darwinism 
and the modern synthesis, there has always existed a minor strand of 
sceptical thought contesting the monism of evolutionary ideas. 
Scientific confrontations with Darwinism in European life sciences 
were probably strongest at the end of the 19th century and especially 
well expressed in Germany, where Ernst Haeckel’s popular and often 
misguided re-interpretations of Darwin had contributed to raising the 
sceptical and cautious front. Also in the University of Tartu, the aca-
demic staff of which was overwhelmingly German until the 1880s, the 
fact of being a Darwinist or non-Darwinist was often decisive when 
appointing someone to an academic position in natural sciences (see 
Mildenberger 2007b). Scientists who argued against the so-far described 
mechanisms of evolution as well as the ideological conclusions often 
drawn on their basis served as the main enemies as well as initiators of 
the development of the evolutionary thought itself (see Mildenberger 
2008). Several of them were not denying evolution as such, but rather 
aimed at drawing attention to the fact that clinging to the mechanisms 
of selection too dogmatically may at a certain point become an obstruc-
tion that diverts attention away from other essential characteristics of 
life. 
One of the authors, who considered evolutionary perspective as 
insufficient for explaining the laws of life, was an Estonian born Baltic-
German biologist, Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944). While introducing a 
combination of Goethean and Kantian philosophies of nature, Uexküll 
relied on a premise that life processes run in a coordinated, plan-like 
manner. Each species and organism possesses its own perceptual as well 
as ontogenetic time and space plans, the interplays of which together 
form a common plan of natural processes. The perceptual space plan 
itself is divided by Uexküll into visual space (depending for example on 
the resolution, view angle of the eye, the ability to distinguish shapes 
and colours), tactile space (depending on the number of tactile recep-
tors) and operational space (related to coordination and motor system 
of the body). Perceptual time plans of different species vary above all 
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due to differences in the duration of one moment (the length of time 
within which no movement can be noticed). Ontogenetic space and time 
are bound with the average lifetime, the length of different life-phases 
and the corresponding morphological organisation of the organism 
(Uexküll 1973[1928]). Thus several works of von Uexküll can be seen 
as attempts to revive the importance of other types of time that living 
beings entail besides evolutionary time. Perceptual and developmental 
times of organisms are his natural scientific priorities.
Dobzhansky’s thesis, cast into Uexküllian convictions, would take 
the following form: “Nothing in life makes sense except in the light of 
Planmässigkeit”. It might be put into modern terms, by replacing the 
term Planmässigkeit with self-organisation or self-regulation, but only 
if the terms retain the idea of “animal subjects” as experiencing agents 
who relate to their environment in an active and meaningful way (for 
similar ideas see Canguilhem 1994: 354–357; Hoffmeyer 2008: 177–182; 
Goldstein 1934). “Time-plan” is the term that could be used here to sum 
up all temporal processes that Uexküll described in the framework of 
the general Planmässigkeit of nature.
The major part of the following text will concentrate on the back-
ground as well as the specificity of Jakob von Uexküll’s theories about 
organic times. The last part of the article will explicate the significance 
of the “organic times” theme for biophilosophical discussions.
Uexküll’s ideas about time in relation to 
his contemporary time-philosophies 
Jakob von Uexküll is certainly not a time-philosopher or at least he 
could not be called one for the reasons that his contemporaries Mar-
tin Heidegger, Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl have been. Unlike 
the latter, who have published extensive monographs on the topic, for 
Uexküll, the question of time in itself is not in the focus of his inte rests. 
In fact, there are hardly any abstract concepts that would interest him 
per se, unless they can be turned into specific ones by explai ning the 
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perception and action of living beings. Although the time of Uexküll’s 
most intensive theoretical contribution coincides with the publication 
of the main works of the abovementioned philosophers, his own works 
are almost untouched by their argumentation. Uexküll only men-
tions Bergson’s concept of dureé (in German, Dauer)1, but more as a 
point of reference than as an important theoretical platform (Uexküll 
1973[1928]: 87). 
The reason why Uexküll’s own theories about the perception of 
temporal phenomena in turn remained practically unnoticed to his 
contemporary philosophers is probably the scarce attention paid by 
him to time perception by man, the philosophical object par excel-
lence. Heidegger, although discussing Uexküll’s umwelt concept in his 
Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (Heidegger 2004[1929–1930]), does 
not mention it in his most important time-philosophical treatise Sein 
und Zeit (Heidegger 2006[1927]). Also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who 
discusses Uexküll’s Umwelt theory and the question of animal subjec-
tivity in his lectures held at the Collège de France at the end of the 
1950s (Merleau-Ponty et al. 2003: 167–178) has focused his attention 
solely on the human cognition and consciousness of time in the chap-
ter “Temporality” of his phenomenological key-work Phenomenology of 
Perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002[1945]: 476–503; Toadvine 2007). Henri 
Bergson and Edmund Husserl2 do not relate themselves to Uexküll in 
any of their works. The themes recurrent in the works of those authors 
(the conditions and character of differentiating past, present and future; 
the ordering of moments in respect with each other on the three-fold 
timeline; possibilities for comprehending all times simultaneously, etc.) 
are not present in any of Uexküll’s reflections on time.
1 Bergson had introduced the concept of durée to describe the individual sensation 
of time, which can not be divided into separate measurable units in the manner the 
objectified, “outer” time is calculated (Bergson 1898). Uexküll uses it to denote a 
difference between the intuition of time and its intellectual definition.
2 Although, as Florian Mildenberger has detected from Husserl’s private library, 
Husserl had read at least one of Uexküll’s articles dating from 1931 (see Milden-
berger 2007a: 87).
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The main sources of inspiration for Uexküll’s own contemplations 
about time were the works of Karl Ernst von Baer and Immanuel Kant. 
The distribution of Uexküll’s ideas about time between the fields of 
developmental biology and sensory physiology coincides with the areas 
of influence of the two authors, Baer providing the principles of embryo-
nic development (although extending also partly to perception with his 
discussion about moments) and Kant providing those concerning the 
mind (extended to perception by Uexküll). In the following paragraphs, 
we shall see how the notion of time is itself provided with a twofold 
meaning, depending on the field where it is used and on the author 
upon whom Uexküll relies.
Ontogeny: The time of becoming and the time of being
Although Uexküll’s own experimental work never included empirical 
research on embryology, the heated debates about the fundamental prin-
ciples of embryonic development, held at the turn of the 20th century, 
were of theoretical as well as empirical interest for him. His discus-
sions about the developmental pathways of organisms even express his 
philosophical views on the symphonic, plan-based structure of nature 
in the most figurative, but also clearest manner (for example, Uexküll 
1912a, 1922, 1924).
The ontogenetic time of the organism can be divided into the time 
of becoming and the time of being. The time of becoming equals the 
time needed for developing functioning organs; the time of being on 
the other hand covers the time when the organs have acquired their 
final form and as such are ready for use. Although the time of beco-
ming as developmental time could, in its turn, be divided into the time 
of formation and the time of further growth, it is above all the first of 
the two that is central for Uexküll’s descriptions of organic formative 
processes. The time of becoming, which at least in the case of mammals 
equals embryogenesis, is described by Uexküll as a technical phase of 
the organism, and the time of being, which equals the post-embryonic 
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phase, is characterised as a mechanical phase (Uexküll 1973[1928]: 
87–90; 1922; 1924: 6–8). Before applying such metaphors, Uexküll used 
the terms formation plan (Entstehungsplan) and performance plan (Leis-
tungsplan) for differentiating between the developmental processes and 
the processes going on between the subjective outer and inner worlds 
(Umwelt und Innenwelt) of an animal (Uexküll 1912a).
Technical and mechanical phases, as two periods in the organism’s 
morphological-physiological time, are characterised by the following 
properties:
1) The technical phase presupposes a linear, irreversible flow of time 
with the full-formed organism as its endpoint. The mechanical 
phase, in contrast, is based on a serial, repetitive and cyclical con-
cept of time. Once formed, all organs are restricted in their activities 
due to anatomical constraints on the one hand and adjustments to 
certain environmental conditions on the other. Habits and repeti-
tive behaviour produced via habits will now replace the former 
novel events of developmental time. The harmonic adjustment of 
the organism and the environment mediated by habits, results in the 
congruity of perceptions and actions (called functional cycle (Funk-
tionskreis) by Uexküll). Such an ideal correspondence between the 
subject and its subjective world (umwelt) leaves little or no room 
for changes in habits and adjustments and has been interpreted as 
problematic for modern biology, where differences in fitness are 
of central importance for evolution (see also Hoffmeyer 2008: 172; 
Stjernfelt 2001).3
2) The technical as well as mechanical phases are characterised by 
certain goal-directed and self-referential activities. In the case of 
the developmental processes of the technical phase, the end-state 
is prospective, that is, the totality of the organism yet to be formed. 
3 Uexküll himself has contested such a closure with his training of seeing-eye dogs 
for the blind. The possibility to change the meanings of objects in the umwelt of the 
dog served as a key premise while teaching the dogs to beware of things important 
for blind people (Uexküll 1933; Sarris, Uexküll 1931).
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The organism of the mechanical phase is rather an entity of mainte-
nance — the persistence of normal life activities is the objective here. 
3) The technical phase is based on an intra-organismic timing — 
the time needed for the development of a certain organ is rather 
independent of extra-organismic conditions. The end of the mecha-
nical phase on the other hand depends mainly on environmental 
impulses. Uexküll uses the terms duration (Dauer) and time span 
(Zeitspanne/ Zeitlange) for drawing a demarcation between those 
two. “The technical period belongs to becoming and has duration, 
the mechanical period belongs to being and lasts for a time span” 
(Uexküll 1973[1928]: 88).4
The terms Uexküll uses to describe the times of different animals are 
strikingly “technical” compared with the other musical or theatrical 
metaphors (the symphony or melody of nature) he uses elsewhere (for 
example, Uexküll, Brock 1935: 46–47; Uexküll 1973[1928]: 116–122, 
1940).5 Uexküll’s Baerian and Goethean inclination to characterise life 
processes with the term “melody” is interpreted by Frederik Stjernfelt 
as follows: “The melody […] articulates an organised structure discon-
nected from the here-and-now of physics and implying a teleological 
circle foreseeing the last note already by the intonation of the first” 
(Stjernfelt 2001: 88). Paradoxically, the same explanation would also 
apply for Uexküll’s technical and mechanical phases, as the procee-
dings of the first always “bear in mind” the functions of the latter as an 
outcome. The notions of the techniques of nature and the symphony 
of nature are finally synthesised in one of Uexküll’s latest works The 
Theory of Meaning (Uexküll 1940: 43–47). 
A comparison with a machine can open up some aspects of biologi-
cal processes — it can even tell half a story — but telling half a story 
can just as well be telling a misleading story. Uexküll thus admits in 
4 “Die technische Periode gehört dem Werden an und hat Dauer, die mechanische 
Periode gehört dem Sein und währt eine Zeitlang” (Uexküll 1973[1928]: 88).
5 Other non-artistic metaphors that Uexküll used for explaining the plan-based 
structure of life extend from crystal building (1924: 1–2) to house (1912a: 1086–
1087) and automobile (Uexküll 1912b: 26–27) constructions.
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one of his articles that as long as we take a look just at the Wirkorgane 
(functional organs) or at the mechanical phase of the animal life, we can 
find striking similarities with machines in their processing of the envi-
ronment, but as soon as we include other essential parts — percep tual 
organs (Merkorgane) and the developmental or technical phase — 
the comparison appears to break down.6 For the same reason the “ani-
mal-machines” concept that explicates the most primitive reactions of 
simpler animals (by starfish, jellyfish, urchin) is only half sound (com-
pare Merleau-Ponty et al. 2003: 169).
Two possible reasons could be discussed, why such technical meta-
phors have entered the otherwise artistic philosophies of Uexküll in 
the first place. They combine metaphysical as well as cultural-historical 
causes. The “organism as a machine” simile that found its peak time in 
the physiological research of the 16th and 17th centuries was influential 
only in certain fields of biology, leaving for example the subject mat-
ter of embryology practically untouched (see Canguilhem 1994: 77–80; 
also Bowler 2008 for the persistence of embryological models until the 
end of the 19th c.). Derived from physiological investigations, all such 
comparisons touched upon the question of how the organism functions, 
at the same time ignoring the questions of its origin. The properties that 
according to Kristian Köchy are revealed in the “machine model” of life — 
self-movement, regularity, functional purposefulness, organisation, 
concurrence of partial structures and functions, rational transparency 
and plan-basedness (Planhaftigkeit) (Köchy 2008: 108) — characterise 
above all the operations of a final structure. From the above-mentioned 
shared properties of machines and organisms, plan-basedness (Plan-
haftigkeit) is most significant for Uexküll. By exchanging the externally 
created causal connections of the machine-parts with the internal teleo-
logical actions of organs, Uexküll ascribes the role of the constructor 
6 “If one exchanges the world processing organ, just one tool is exchanged for the 
other. If the world creator is exchanged, so is the world also exchanged.” — “ Tauscht 
man ein weltbearbeitendes Organ, so tauscht man bloss ein Werkzeug gegen das 
andere. Tauscht man die Weltbildner, so taucht man die Welt.” (Uexküll 1926: 182)
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of the machine to the organism in the formation and to the activity of 
organs. 
Explaining the cultural background of biological metaphors, 
Uexküll claims that most of the Anglo-American authors use simi-
les with human artefacts, whereas Germans prefer comparisons with 
inorganic nature (for example, Bütschli’s comparison with a geyser, 
Helmholtz’s candle-flame) (Uexküll 1928). It seems astounding that in 
several of his own analogies, Uexküll rather follows the Anglo-Ameri-
can path, although there is no way he would have identified himself 
with those traditions.
If we divide the positions of his contemporaries concerning the 
principles of embryonic development between the two opposites — 
epigenetics7, a position which holds that the final form of the organism 
depends on the mutual influences of different developmental processes; 
and preformationism, which assumes that the organism is preformed 
and predetermined even in its most basic units of development (that is, 
in the zygote) — then Uexküll rather follows the first line of thought 
(Uexküll 1973[1928]: 216–220). In addition to Baer, who served as 
the main source for Uexküll’s discussions on embryogenesis, Hans 
Driesch and Hans Spemann, two of the most significant representatives 
of epigenetic thought at the beginning of the 20th century, also played 
a significant role as his sources. 
The confrontation between epigeneticists and preformationists dates 
back to the very early days of biological thought. Due to a significant 
development of experimental and observational methods at the end of the 
19th century, the earlier philosophical debate acquired an empirical cha -
racter with the works of Wilhelm Roux, August Weismann, Oscar Hert-
wig and Hans Driesch. The philosophical implications, however, were 
preserved in the interpretations of experimental data and are also revealed 
in Uexküll’s comments on his contemporary embryological research.
7 Note that the term “epigenesis” carries a rather different meaning in the biophi-
losophical and historical context compared with the meaning of the term in modern 
genetics. The meaning of “epigenetics” in genetics stems from C. H. Waddington 
and refers to the origination of the phenotype from the genotype.
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Perceptual time: A moment after a moment
Research in sensory physiology served as Uexküll’s main biologi-
cal research field throughout his scientific career. His reflections on 
the ontogenetic time of organisms revealed some of his metaphysical 
positions on nature. A strong semiotic viewpoint can be detected in 
his research on the perceptual time of animals. This is expressed in 
his ideas about the correspondence between physiological processes, 
morphological structures and environmental objects as realised only 
through the mediation of perceptual signs (Merkzeichen) and opera-
tional signs (Wirkzeichen) (Uexküll, Kriszat 1956; Schiller 1957: xiii).
According to Uexküll, the perceptual time and space of all orga-
nisms consist of moments as the smallest units of time (Momenten) and 
places (Orten) as the smallest units of space. But the two terms carry a 
rather unconventional meaning in his works, referring just as much to 
the anatomical-physiological specificities of animals as to the forms in 
the outside world, caused by the specific anatomies.
The anatomical equivalents of places are the retinal points or seeing 
elements of the retina (that is, cone and rod cells), which bring about 
local signs. Local signs serve as mediators between two material reali-
ties — the physiological and environmental. The number of seeing 
elements determines the number of places as well as the sharpness of 
vision. The image of the same setting, formed by the fly’s eye and by 
the human eye, differs like the picture made with a low resolution and a 
high resolution camera — the smaller number of seeing elements results 
in a lower resolution of the image and thus a coarser picture than that 
produced by an eye possessing a higher frequency of seeing elements 
(Uexküll, Kriszat 1956: 38–42; Uexküll 1973[1928]: 17–21; compare 
Rüting 2004: 56–58).
A moment is the time when the world stands still, where the dyna-
mics of the world have been lost to the immanence of presence. Like his 
reflections about ontological time, Uexküll’s ideas and concepts about 
perceptual time also have some connections with the similar ideas of 
Karl Ernst von Baer. While discussing the etymology of the smal lest 
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units of time, Baer considers both initial bodily perceptions and reac-
tions as the sources for the specific time concepts. “The Romans named 
the smallest time span momentum, or also punctum temporis. Punctum 
means a stab, punctum temporis is maybe the time that I need to per-
ceive a stab; the word momentum is derived from the verb movere, to 
move. A jerk that follows a stab was probably meant with that” (Baer 
1992[1862]: 22).8
The separation of perception and action in such an explanation 
suited Uexküll’s own separation between the perceptual world (Merk-
welt) and the reactive world (Wirkwelt) well, which together form the 
species-specific umwelt of an animal. Moments are thus just forma-
tive parts of the Merkwelt, and for the Wirkwelt other measures of 
time, depending on the contraction times of specific muscles, are to be 
applied (Uexküll 1973[1928]: 85–87). 
Just like the local signs served as mediators between places outside 
the organism and seeing elements (Sehelementen) of the organism, 
moment signs (Momentzeichen) are the means for projecting a time 
span to the processes taking place outside the organism. But unlike the 
correspondence between seeing elements and outer places, there are no 
such corresponding specific sensory elements for the moments. The 
colleague of Jakob von Uexküll at the Institute for Umwelt Research 
in Hamburg, Gerhard Brecher distinguished between three types of 
human moments — acoustic, optical and tactile. But as far as their dura-
tions are the same (1/18 sec), they cannot depend on the specific organs 
or receptors. Rather, concludes Brecher, a moment is a property of our 
nervous system (as far as our ganglion cells are not capable of receiving 
more than a certain number of stimuli per time unit as separate stimuli) 
(Brecher 1932: 209–210).
Time unites the intra- and extraorganismic processes, binds them 
to the same moments, whereby the simultaneous flow of outer events 
8 “Die Römer nannten das kleinste Zeitmass momentum, oder auch punctum tem-
poris. Punctum heisst ein Stich, punctum temporis ist vielleicht die Zeit, welche ich 
brauche, um einen Stich zu empfinden; das Wort momentum leitet man ab vom 
Zeitworte movere, bewegen. Man hat damit wahrscheinlich die Zuckung im Sinne 
gehabt, die auf einen plötzlichen Stich folgt” (Baer 1992: 22).
48 Riin Magnus
and perceptions is guaranteed. Time thus does not make a separation 
between the body and the environment, like space does. Uexküll is 
referring here to Kant and his notion of apperception, claiming that 
apperception, through which the unity of Self is created, possesses a 
moment sign, but not a local sign (Uexküll 1973[1928]: 70–71). 
The concept of a moment was not merely a theoretical one for 
Uexküll — its connections with the subjective properties of a place 
helped to measure the species-specific sensations of time while recor-
ding the perception of movement9. The same time span (Zeitspanne) 
includes different numbers of moments in the umwelten of different 
species. The organisms that have more moments in one time span (Zeit-
spanne), feel the world passing more slowly than we do, and those that 
have less (like a snail for example, whose moments are as if stretched 
out) feel the movements faster.
Uexküll’s notion of moment as the primary unit of perceptual time 
also reveals a significant difference between the concept of time he uses 
for ontogenetic and perceptual processes. In the case of ontogenetics, 
the development of organs was already “bearing in mind” their func-
tions in the future. Perceptual time in the form of moments does not 
possess any other dimensions than “now” or presence. Time here is not 
discussed as a universal perceptual connector, which unites the stand-
stills following one another. As the duration of a moment, its variability 
in different species can be reached only via an inter-species comparative 
analysis.
Certainly, there are several problematic points and questions left 
open with such generalisations of animal time-perception, but the value 
of such an analysis lies in the fact that while it provides an experimental 
method for detecting the multitude of time-perceptions, it also remains 
explicit in its philosophical assumptions about the qualitative percep-
tual differences lying behind the quantitative characteristics.
9 Besides G. Brecher also M. Beniuc was conducting experimental work on the 
moments of animals, namely Siamese fighting fish (Betta splendens) (Beniuc 1933).
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Time-plans in relation to three planes of Planmässigkeit 
To stress the mutuality of the relations between the organism and the 
environment, Uexküll did not use the word adaptation, but was tal king 
about adjustment (Einpassung) instead (see Cheung 2004: 16; Kull 2004: 
108). He differentiated between three levels of adjustment: (1) the adjust-
ment of organs to the organism; (2) the adjustment of the body and the 
umwelt; (3) the adjustment of different umwelten (Uexküll 1927: 696). 
Next, I will sum up the central conclusions that can be drawn from 
Uexküll’s idea about time-plans by organising and explaining them in 
the framework of those three levels of adjustment.
First, the adjustment of the organs to the organism demonstrates 
that compared with the physical phenomena, where what happens next 
can be predicted from what has happened before, life always includes 
the influence of the coming events on the former. A final function 
determines therefore the development of the form (the mechanical 
phase determines the technical). The prospective character of organ-
building lies in their development into a particular form as if already 
considering what the animal will need for sustaining itself. How the 
development of organs is determined by the animal’s needs is even 
directly obser vable in the case of some simpler animals, which are not 
just using the already existing organs, but are constantly during their 
lifetime buil ding organs according to their needs. Good examples are 
Paramaecium or Amoeba proteus, which form a food vacuole when a 
certain amount of food has entered the body. The other examples are 
various archaeocytes of sponges that can take up the function and form 
most needed at the moment.
The second conclusion fits in the level where the plan-like adjust-
ment of an organism and its umwelt is under question: time-plan is 
immanent to the organism, it is subject-bound and it unfolds accor-
ding to the species-specific time schedule. The way time is organised in 
each subject depends on its perceptual properties and abilities as well as 
species-specific developmental constraints and possibilities. This could 
be best articulated in Uexküll’s own words: “If we think of the umwelt 
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of an animal at a certain moment as a circle, then we could add each 
following moment as a new umwelt-circle. In this way we get a tube that 
would correspond to the lifetime of the animal” (Uexküll 1973[1928]: 
108).10 Just like each species possesses a specific and fixed set of sensory 
organs that determine the form of outside objects for its members, it 
also possesses a specific timing for different life activities as well as for 
the length of life itself. Such an Umwelttunnel seems to be bound with 
individuality; it is hard to imagine how it could be applied to collective 
organisms (like corals or polyps) or modular plants whose growth and 
lifetime are strictly bound with prevailing environmental conditions 
and for whom death is not an individual loss of existence, but rather a 
matter of restrictions to further reproduction.
On the other hand, we can find examples of variable species-specific 
umwelt-circles even by organisms with rather simple organisations. 
For some insects, amphibians and crustaceans that undergo metamor-
phosis, new life periods and activities are bound with a corresponding 
transformation in form. The switches from the technical phase to the 
mechanical thus take place several times throughout one’s lifetime. 
The multifarious transitions from developmental phases to functional 
stages are well demonstrated by Uexküll on the example of the proto-
zoan Plasmodium vivax, a malaria parasite, whose lifecycle includes 
the succession of at least four different forms, four metamorphoses all 
dependent on the phase and place of development (Uexküll 1922). In 
the lifecycle of this microscopic protozoan, the technical and mechani-
cal phases are alternating, while one always prepares the conditions 
for the other to appear. The protozoan starts its life in a form called a 
sporozoit, which enters the salivary glands of the mosquito. As the next 
step it migrates through the bite of the mosquito into human blood and 
from there to the liver tissues. In the liver it grows and acquires another 
form known as a schizont; it lives like that for a while, and then starts 
10 “Wenn man die Umwelt eines Tieres in einem bestimmten Moment als Kreis 
darstellt, so kann man jeden darauffolgenden Moment als einen neuen Umweltkreis 
hinzufügen. Auf diese Weise erhielte man eine Röhre, die der Länge des Lebens 
dieses Tieres entspräche” (Uexküll 1973[1928]: 108).
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to divide into smaller merozoites, the life activity of which makes the 
tissues dissolve. The merozoites enter the human erythrocytes where 
they multiply again, and some of the merozoites start forming sexual 
forms (micro- and macrogamets), which get into the intestines of the 
mosquito and the cycle may start again.
The third conclusion of Uexküll’s time-concept demonstrates the 
interplay of time-plans between different organisms: the living world 
consists of different lifetimes, each unfolding according to their spe-
cific timelines. This can be seen as an ecological conclusion of the first 
statement. As all organisms live according to their own species-specific 
times, we would get a nearly endless diversity of times, if we take into 
consideration the whole network of inter-species’ as well as intra-spe-
cies’ timings. A disturbance in the time-plan of a certain living being 
also brings about a change in the time plans of other species related to it. 
Contracting the duration of a snail’s moment would bring it to noticing 
objects it hasn’t been able to detect before. By changing the flowering 
time of entomogamous plants, a corresponding shift in the time of its 
co-evolutionary insects’ activities has to be assumed.
Technological time and organic time-plans 
Biotechnology today seems to have to deal with a paradoxical notion 
of organic time. On the one hand, biotechnologies are working with 
organisms brought about by natural, that is, evolutionary time. On the 
other hand the immanent character of the trials and errors of evolu-
tion is denied by an introduction of scientific and human time into the 
organisms. Technological time11 is thus a time that balances between 
the past reality of evolutionary time and the possibility of shortcutting 
the time by one product of the same evolutionary process itself. It seems 
11 ‘Technological time’ is used in this article as a term that denotes any kind of 
temporal organisation where technological devices are involved (those might be 
means of transportation, means of communication, etc.)
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as if natural selection has found an effective, but self-bound tool that 
works solely as a means of its own existence. 
Technological time, a fundamental part of human existence, is 
expressed in a wide variety of phenomena, starting from everyday tools 
and ending with genetically modified organisms. The technological 
time of such artefacts means that they are above all created with the 
aim of compressing and saving other time-types — be it evolutionary 
time in the case of GMOs or the time needed for warranting subsistence 
in the case of tools. The presence of technological time in all human 
activities means that defining what is a natural time for humans cannot 
be done in the same manner as was done by other animals. The tempo 
and rhythm of one’s lifetime are obviously dependent on lifestyle and 
thus bound with cultural as well as individual contexts and choices. 
Also the average human life expectancy, itself an expression of the cur-
rent social as well as economic umwelt of people, can vary in as wide 
borders as from 82,7 years in Japan to 45,9 years in the Central African 
Republic (data for the years 2005–2010; World Populati on Prospects: 
The 2010 Revision12). 
On the background of the indeterminacy of human time, it is easy 
to make the same assumption about all other living beings. Uexküllian 
idea about time-plans warns us about falling into such an anthropomor-
phic fallacy. The above-sketched idea about the subjective time-plans of 
all organisms could enrich the debates of bioethics as well as the phi-
losophies of nature conservation, by showing how the subjective timings 
of different organisms are essential for the biodiversity of the natural 
world. Such subjective timings induce diversity on three levels at least: 
evolutionary, ecological and perceptual. 
Stressing the reality of different evolutionary and ecological timings 
would confirm that the categories of “too fast” and “too slow” for a 
species are objective categories, the measures of which are set by all 
present environmental conditions and not just one of those — man. 
Considering the categories of “too slow” and “too fast” on an evolutio-
nary and ecological time scale could enrich for example the discussions 
12 http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/mortality.htm
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in bioethics about genetic engineering as well as the discussions about 
the introduction of foreign species. In the latter case that might open 
up some new perspectives in the so-far seemingly unproductive ping-
pong between two opposing claims about something being absolutely 
possible or not possible (the impossibility to cross the natural borders 
vs. “they could do it anyway in some time” — due to climate change, for 
example). As mentioned above, from the ecological point of view, the 
notion of time-plans also explicates how the time of each organism is 
attuned according to the times of other organisms related to it. Chan-
ging the length of the life-periods of a species certainly influences the 
established adaptations. 
From the perceptual side, time-plans could be integrated to the 
explanations of the subjective character of experience, inseparable 
from the conscious mental states of organisms (see Nagel 2002[1979]: 
166). Timing in the human world helps to plan and thus guarantee a 
certain order and security for the future, which in its unplanned form 
appears as a generator of uncertainty. The wrong timing is a source of 
stress in the world of humans as well as of other animals. Well-being in 
both cases is guaranteed only if all processes are running in time. Being 
forced to fit totally into someone else’s time schedule and being thus 
deprived of one’s own choices in planning future events is a depriva-
tion of subjectivity. Thus the discussions of animal rights could just as 
well include the question of whether other biological subjects besides 
humans have a right to their own timing.
Conclusion
I have used the notion of “time-plans” to explain the temporal part of 
Jakob von Uexküll’s theory about the general Planmässigkeit of nature, 
where neither chance mutations nor causal determinations form the 
core of the biological world, but meaningful relations between diffe-
rent organisms as well as between the organisms and the environment. 
When discussing the lifetime of an organism, Uexküll divided it into a 
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technical phase or the time of formation and the mechanical phase or 
the time of functioning. By expanding the ideas of Immanuel Kant, time 
as a perceptual category was added to them. The perceptual organs, 
the nervous system of the animal and the time-perception induced by 
them has been attuned so that the animal can recognise and react to 
the objects essential for its life. Although in the formative stage the 
organism does not possess full-formed sensory organs, the cell divisions 
and the reactions of cells to each other’s signals work as if the develo-
ping organism is sensing what it has to become. Uexküll compared 
such plan-based developments with a melody and was talking about a 
developmental rule (Regel) that guarantees the right developmental 
pathways.
Human technologies are making use of the products of time (either 
developmental or evolutionary forms) that have existed long before the 
birth of mankind. Modern biotechnologies are working with a substrate 
that has been formed by the same natural processes that have moulded 
man, who now serves as a channel through which the former pathways 
of selection can be directed. Against this background, the Uexküllian 
perspective draws attention to the fact that technology itself is just part 
of one umwelt, which exists side-by-side with many others and that the 
preservation of the diversity of subjective time-plans plays a significant 
role in the persistence of biological diversity in general. 13 
13 Earlier version of this article has been published as Magnus, Riin (2011), The 
biological and philosophical implications of Jakob von Uexküll’s time-plans. In: Lu-
kas, Liina; Plath, Ulrike; Tüür, Kadri (eds.), Umweltphilosophie und Landschaftsden-
ken im baltischen Kulturraum/Environmental Philosophy and Landscape Thinking. 
(Collegium litterarum 24.) Tallinn: Underi ja Tuglase Kirjanduskeskus, 137–153. 
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Временные планы организмов: путешествия Якоба 
фон Юкскюля в темпоральность живых существ
Термином «временной план» в статье обозначаются разнообразные 
временные процессы, описанные Якобом фон Юкскюлем (1864–1944) 
в рамках концепции общей планомерности (или упорядоченности: 
Planmässigkeit) природы. Несмотря на то, что Юкскюль мало сопри-
касался с современными ему представителями философии времени, 
тема субъективного времени организмов формирует основную 
часть его теории Umwelt. В качестве альтернативы господствующей 
эволюционистской концепции времени в биологических дискуссиях 
той эпохи, Юкскюль считал понятия «время восприятия» и «время 
развития» своими исследовательскими приоритетами. Обсуждая 
особенности этих параметров, Юкскюль занимает эпигенетиче-
скую позицию. При исследовании перцепционного времени важным 
становится обнаружение мелчайших единиц времени (моментов) 
и исследование восприятия движения, оформленного на основе 
последовательности этих моментов. Последняя часть статьи объяснит 
значение понятия «временного плана» для биофилософских рассуж-
дений. Биоэтический вопрос, вырисовывающийся из работ Юкскюля, 
мог бы прозвучать так: могут ли другие биологические субъекты — 
помимо людей — иметь право на свое собственное время?
Organismide ajaplaanid: Jakob von Uexkülli 
retked elusolendite ajalisusse
Artiklis tähistatakse terminiga “ajaplaan” mitmeid erinevaid ajalisi protsesse, 
mida Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) kirjeldas üldise looduse plaanipärasuse 
(Planmässigkeit) raames. Kuigi Uexküllil oli vähe kokkupuuteid tollaste aja-
filosoofidega, moodustab organismide subjektiivsete aegade ja ajastuse teema 
olulise osa tema omailmateooriast. Uexküll pidas organismide taju- ning 
arenguaega oma loodusteaduslikeks uurimiskeskmeteks, vastandades neid 
bioloogia tollastes aruteludes domineerinud evolutsioonilisele ajale. Arengu-
ajast kõneldes lähtub Uexküll epigeneetilisest positsioonist. Tajuaja uurimustes 
on oluline väikseimate ajaühikute (momentide) tuvastamine ning nende 
järgnevuse põhjal kujuneva liikumistaju uurimine. Artikli viimases osas selgi-
tatakse “ajaplaani” mõiste olulisust biofilosoofiliste arutelude jaoks. Bioeetiline 
küsimus, mis Uexkülli töödest välja koorub, võiks kõlada järgnevalt: kas teistel 
bioloogilistel subjektidel peale inimese on õigus oma ajale?
